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TAXATION-SALE AND LEASEBACK-MULTIPLE PARTY
TRANSACTION WITH ECONOMIC SUBSTANCE AND BUSI-
NESS PURPOSE IS VALID. Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435
U.S. 561 (1978).
The taxpayer, Frank Lyon Company, purchased from and si-
multaneously leased back to the Worthen Bank and Trust Company
a building which Worthen used as its principal office building and
banking facility. Lyon claimed, as owner of the building, deprecia-
tion and interest deductions on its 1969 federal income tax return.
The Commissioner of Internal Revenue determined this transaction
was not a sale-and-leaseback but only a financing transaction.
Lyon, according to the Commissioner, did not possess an adequate
ownership interest in the building to claim these deductions. The
United States Supreme Court disagreed and held that the transac-
tion was a sale-and-leaseback and therefore, the deductions were
properly claimed. Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561
(1978).
A sale-and-leaseback transaction has become a recognized and
conventional method for acquiring the use of both real and personal
property.' The arrangement involves the sale of property by its
owner-user, who simultaneously with the buyer's purchase, enters
into a lease with that buyer for the seller's continued use of the
property. 2 When properly entered into and executed, these transac-
tions produce favorable business results and tax advantages to both
the seller-lessee and the purchaser-lessor. The transaction benefits
the seller-lessee by freeing working capital without the loss of the
property's use.3 A sale-and-leaseback will also improve the seller-
lessee's balance sheet (subject to appropriate disclosures provided
by generally accepted accounting standards), allow immediate real-
ization of gain or loss, and provide subsequent rental deductions.
Sale-and-leaseback provides the purchaser-lessor with rental in-
come which can be off-set by a depreciation deduction4 and an
interest expense deduction.' By utilizing one of the methods of ac-
celerated depreciation' in conjunction with the interest expense
1. Mandell, Tax Aspects of Sales and Leasebacks as Practical Devices for Transfer and
Operation of Real Property, 18 N.Y.U. INST. ON FED. TAX. 17 (1960).
2. Marcus, Real Estate Purchase-Lease backs as Secured Loans, 2 REAL ESTATE L.J. 664
(1974). For an article on the sale-and-leaseback of equipment, see Zeitlin, Tax Planning in
Equipment-Leasing Shelters, 21 U.So. CAL. 1969 TAX INST. 621.





deduction, the purchaser-lessor should have more deductions than
income from the leased property for several years following the
transaction.
The most formidable problem in structuring a sale-and-
leaseback is the difficulty in determining when the courts will hold
that a sale-and-leaseback is merely a secured loan.7 "For over
twenty years, taxpayers, the IRS and the courts have been searching
for guidelines indicating when a sale-leaseback should be recognized
for tax purposes."'8 Guidelines in sale-and-leaseback cases are hard
to delineate because they are based on factual determinations un-
supported by clearly defined regulations or code provisions. Prior to
the United States Supreme Court's decision in Lyon, the law consis-
ted of a case by case determination of the facts attendant to each
transaction. A significant factor was the determination of owner-
ship. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals summed up the problem
by stating that "the determination of whether the grantor of the
conveyance to the corporation remains the owner for the purpose of
taxation is a question of fact. . . and. . such determination must
depend upon the terms of the conveyance and upon all circumstan-
ces attendant on its creation and operation."9
Cases which are helpful in searching for sale-and-leaseback
guidelines include Helvering v. F. & R. Lazarus & Co., 10 upon which
the Commissioner in Lyon relied; Helvering v. Clifford," which
adopted the doctrine of the bundle of ownership rights; Sun Oil Co.
v. Commissioner, 12 which used the Eighth Circuit's holding in Frank
Lyon Co. v. United States13 as authority; and American Realty
Trust v. United States,"4 a Fourth Circuit decision which conflicted
with the Eighth Circuit's holding in Lyon.
In Lazarus, 15 the taxpayer transferred "ownership" of three
7. Marcus, supra note 2, at 669.
8. Rosenberg and Weinstein, Sale-Leasebacks; An analysis of These Transactions after
the Lyon Decision, 45 J. OF TAX. 146, (Sept. 1976). This article considered the impact of the
Circuit Court's decision on future sale-and-leaseback transactions.
9. Sheldon Bldg. Corp. v. Commissioner, 118 F.2d 835, 836 (7th Cir. 1941). Other cases
which the court considered include: Halvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331 (1940); Higgins v.
Smith, 308 U.S. 473 (1940); Griffiths v. Halvering, 308 U.S. 355 (1939); Gregory v. Helvering,
293 U.S. 465 (1935); Corliss v. Bowers, 281 U.S. 376 (1930); and City National Bank & Trust
Co. v. United States, 109 F.2d 191 (7th Cir. 1940).
10. 308 U.S. 252 (1939).
11. 309 U.S. 331 (1940).
12. 562 F.2d 258 (3d Cir. 1977).
13. 536 F.2d 746 (8th Cir. 1976).
14. 498 F.2d 1194 (4th Cir. 1974).
15. 308 U.S. 252 (1939).
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buildings to a bank-trustee and continued to claim depreciation
deductions for them. The Commissioner challenged these deduc-
tions contending Lazarus did not have "ownership" of the buildings.
The United States Supreme Court examined the transaction and
the company's ownership interest which included responsibility for
capital loss from wear, tear, and exhaustion of the building. The
Court concluded that Lazarus still owned the buildings; it had only
received a loan from the bank-trustee secured by the buildings. In
the Court's view, the form of the transaction was a sale-and-
leaseback; but the substance was merely a financing transaction.
The doctrine of the bundle of ownership rights was adopted in
Clifford. ,6 The taxpayer, Clifford, had transferred property to a trust
of five years duration for his wife and children. He maintained a
substantial degree of control over the property. Clifford was the
trustee and had all voting powers incident to the trusteed shares of
stock; he had the power to invest any money in the trust estate and
to compromise any claims held by him as trustee. The Court deter-
mined that the trust income was includable in Clifford's gross in-
come because "[tihe bundle of rights which he retained was so
substantial that . . . 'for the purpose of taxation he [was] treated
as owner altogether.""'
In Sun Oil Co.,18 the taxpayer, Sunray, had transferred owner-
ship of 320 service station sites to a tax exempt trust and simultane-
ously leased these sites back from the-trust. Sunray (the predecessor
of Sun Oil Co.) then deducted from its taxable income rental pay-
ments to the trust for the use of the sites. The Third Circuit Court
of Appeals disallowed this deduction, stating that the transaction
did not constitute a sale because Sunray continued to bear the risks,
burdens, and benefits of ownership.
In another case, American Realty Trust,5 the taxpayer had
purchased property and simultaneously leased it back to the seller.
The taxpayer contended that the transaction constituted a "good
faith" purchase and leaseback, but the Commissioner maintained
that it was a sham, a mere financial arrangement. The Fourth Cir-
cuit affirmed the trial court's decision that the transaction was a
valid sale-and-leaseback. The court found that the purchase and
leaseback was not a tax avoidance device. There were commercial
16. Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331 (1940). Application of the doctrine of the bundle
of ownership rights is not limited to sale-and-leaseback cases.
17. Id. at 337.
18. Sun Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 562 F.2d 258 (3d Cir. 1977).
19. American Realty Trust v. United States, 498 F.2d 1194 (4th Cir. 1974).
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factors, (e.g. a fair purchase price, an arm's-length transaction and
the availability of "wraparound" financing which encouraged the
purchaser to act quickly),20 which underlay the transaction. In addi-
tion, the parties intended that the ownership would pass to Ameri-
can Realty Company.
In summary, before the Lyon decision, case law had established
several guidelines for a sale-and-leaseback transaction. These
guidelines included the following: each case was dependent upon its
own facts; courts considered the substance of the transaction over
its form; a true sale conveyed the risks, burdens, and benefits of
ownership to the purchaser; the intent of the parties was considered;
and finally, the transaction's primary purpose should not be tax
avoidance.
With these guidelines in mind, an examination of the facts in
Lyon reveals that in 1965 Worthen began to plan a multi-story bank
and office building-the Worthen Building-in Little Rock, Arkan-
sas. When Worthen realized that its ownership of the building
would not be feasible because of various state and federal restric-
tions, 2' the bank opened negotiations with several investors. Wor-
then wanted to sell the building and lease it back from the pur-
chaser. The bank had already arranged construction financing with
outside lenders and wanted the purchaser-lessor to assume all in-
debtedness.
Lyon, a closely held Arkansas corporation engaged in the distri-
bution of home furnishings, was one of several parties interested in
the investment.22 Frank Lyon, the majority stockholder and Chair-
man of the Board of the Frank Lyon Company, was also serving on
the Worthen Board of Directors at the time of this transaction. Lyon
offered to purchase the building for $500,000 and assume total lia-
bility on the construction financing and the permanent loan. The
total purchase price, to include the $500,000 and assumption of
liability on the construction financing and permanent loan, was not
to exceed $7,640,000. Worthen accepted this offer, and agreements
were executed conveying the building to Lyon and leasing the build-
20. Id. at 1194.
21. Originally Worthen was to own the facility but could not because the debentures
used to finance the purchase would not be marketable at the interest rates allowable under
Arkansas law. Also, ownership by Worthen required the approval of the Arkansas State Bank
Department and the Federal Reserve System. See ARK. STAT. ANN. 67-547.1 (Cum. Supp.
1977); 12 U.S.C. 371d; 12 C.F.R. 265.2 (f) (7) (1978).
22. Other investors who had indicated an interest included Goldman, Sachs and Co.;
White, Weld and Co.; Eastman Dillon; Union Securities and Co.; and Stephens, Inc.
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ing back to Worthen.13 The building was completed and Worthen
took possession in December 1969.
On its 1969 federal income tax return, Lyon claimed as deduc-
tions one month's interest on the permanent financing, one month's
depreciation on the building, interest on the construction loan, and
sums for legal and other expenses incurred in connection with the
transaction. On audit, the Commissioner determined that Lyon was
not the owner of the Worthen Building and that the sale-and-
leaseback arrangement was merely a financing transaction in which
Lyon loaned Worthen $500,000.2 The Commissioner assessed a
$280,387.20 tax deficiency against Lyon.
Lyon paid the assessment and then filed a claim for refund in
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkan-
sas. The district court ruled in Lyon's favor, holding that the
claimed deductions were allowable.25 On appeal by the Commis-
sioner, the Eighth Circuit reversed, stating that Lyon "toted an
empty bundle" of ownership rights which were too insubstantial to
establish a claim to the status of owner for tax purposes.2 1 The
23. On May 1, 1968, Worthen leased the site to Lyon for 76 years and 7 months. The
same day, Worthen signed an agreement to lease from Lyon the building for a primary term
of 25 years with options in Worthen to extend the lease for eight additional five year terms-a
total of 65 years. The rent Worthen was to pay would be exactly equal to the mortgage
payments Lyon would make on the permanent loan. Therefore, at the end of the initial lease,
the loan would be amortized, but Lyon would not have recovered its $500,000 cash invest-
ment.
24. In looking at the sale-and-leaseback transaction, the Commissioner determined
that the ownership rights acquired by Lyon were too thin to substantiate the claim of owner-
ship. Ownership for tax purposes was likened to a bundle of sticks with Lyon toting "an empty
bundle."
25. The district court found for Lyon based on the following: parties intended a sale-
and-leaseback; the substance as well as the form of the transaction was a sale-and-leaseback
with the option to repurchase; Lyon held the legal title under Arkansas law and for federal
income tax purposes; Lyon needed to diversify its holdings; Lyon needed to use its accumu-
lated earnings; Lyon was the borrower and sole obligor; Worthen was under no obligaton to
repay Lyon the $500,000; and the other terms of the agreement were consistent with a sale-
and-leaseback agreement. Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, (1975) FED. TAXES (P-H) (36
A.F.T.R.2d) 75-5154 (E.D.Ark. June 11, 1975).
26. The court concluded with the Commission that Lyon toted an empty bundle of
ownership sticks. The court considered the following factors in reaching this conclusion:
Worthen retained the tax deduction for investment credit and sales taxes paid upon the
materials used in construction; the lease agreement circumscribed the usual right of an
owner to obtain a profit from his investment by transferring his interest to a third party; any
appreciation realized as a result of condemnation accrued to Worthen; the parties geared the
purchase-option price to the unpaid balance in the mortgage plus taxpayer's initial invest-
ment plus accrued interest at the limited rate of 6%; the final option price at the end of the
initial 25 year term reflected the taxpayer's initial investment plus compound interest; fi-
nally, Worthen retained ultimate control over the disposition of the building for 65 years.
Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 536 F.2d 746 (8th Cir. 1976).
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United States Supreme Court, finding a valid sale-and-leaseback
transaction, concluded that it was Lyon's capital that was invested
in the building according to the agreement of the parties. It was
Lyon, therefore, who was entitled to the depreciation deductions
under the Internal Revenue Code." The Court cited twenty-six af-
firmative factors giving substance and economic reality to the sale-
and-leaseback transaction, and in summary stated:
In short, we hold that where, as here, there is a genuine multiple-
party transaction with economic substance which is compelled or
encouraged by business or regulatory realities, is imbued with tax-
independent considerations, and is not shaped solely by tax-
avoidance features that have meaningless labels attached, the
Government should honor the allocation of rights and duties effec-
tuated by the parties. 8
The Court's reasoning can best be clarified by examining sepa-
rately each of these five indicia of a true sale-and-leaseback transac-
tion.
A Genuine Multiple Party Transaction
The Commissioner had relied heavily on Lazarus, "concluding
that Worthen, like Lazarus, still kept the "bundle of ownership
rights" and should not be allowed to claim the deductions. However,
the United States Supreme Court distinguished Lyon from Lazarus
by noting that the Lazarus "transaction was one involving only two
(and not multiple) parties, the taxpayer-department store and the
trustee-bank. ' 30 In the present case, Lyon, Worthen, New York Life
(permanent financing), and the First National City Bank (construc-
tion financing) were the principal parties.3 ' "Thus, the presence of
the third party, in our view, significantly distinguishes this case
from Lazarus and removes the latter as controlling authority.""2
Where there is a genuine multiple party transaction (i.e., more than
two), the third-party creditor could reach the other assets of the
purchaser-lessor in the event of default.
The Court also distinguished Lyon from Sun Oil, 3 "a two-party
case with the added feature that the second party was a tax-exempt
27. 435 U.S. 561.
28. Id. at 583.
29. Helvering v. F. & R. Lazarus & Co., 308 U.S. 252 (1939).
30. 435 U.S. 561, 575.
31. Id. at 567.
32. Id. at 576.
33. Sun Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 562 F.2d 258'(3d Cir. 1977).
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pension trust. ' 34 The absence of a third party does not automati-
cally invalidate a sale-and-leaseback transaction. The presence of
the third party, however, adds credence to a sale-and-leaseback
transaction .36
With Economic Substance
The Commissioner and the court of appeals had determined
there was insufficient economic substance to the sale-and-leaseback
transaction, and, therefore, Lyon could not claim the depreciation
and interest deductions. When the United States Supreme Court
examined the economic substance of the Worthen-Lyon transaction,
it found that Lyon alone was liable on the indebtedness. 7 The Court
noted the district court's finding that the rentals and option prices
detailed in the agreement 38 were reasonable; that Worthen could
walk away from the relationship at the expiration of the lease and
would probably do so if the option price were more than the current
worth of the building to Worthen; 39 and that Lyon was a substantial
company, totally independent of Worthen.'. The Court also ob-
served that there was no legal obligation for Worthen to ever repay
Lyon the $500,000 which the Commissioner had contended was a
loan."
As the Court pointed out, the economic substance of some of
these factors could be questionable. For example, the rent equalled
the principal and interest payments, and in effect, would amortize
the permanent financing over the term of the lease. In addition, the
re-purchase option prices were the sum of the unpaid balance of the
permanent financing and Lyon's $500,000 investment with 6 percent
34. 435 U.S. 561, 575.
35. American Realty Trust v. United States, 498 F.2d 1194 (4th Cir. 1974).
36. The Court listed among the twenty-six factors in Lyon the following indicators of a
multiple party transaction: The presence of several finance organizations seriously interested
in participating in the transaction and in the resolution of Worthen's problem; the submission
of formal proposals by several of those organizations; the bargaining process and period that
ensued; the competitive nature of the bidding; the bona fide character of the negotiations;
and the three party aspect of the transaction. 435 U.S. 561, 582.
37. Id.
38. The stated quarterly rent for the first eleven years of the lease was $145,581.03. For
the next 14 years, the quarterly rent was $153.289.32, and for the option periods the rent was
$300,000 per year. Worthen had the option to repurchase the building at the following times
and prices: 11/30/80 (after 11 years)-$6,325,169.85 11/30/84 (after 15 years)-$5,432,607.32
11/30/89 (after 20 years)-$4,187.328.04 11/30/94 (after 25 years)-$2,145,935.00
39. 435 U.S. 561, 583.
40. Id. at 582.
41. Id. at 579.
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interest compounded on that investment.4 2 The Court decided that
despite these elements which weighed against a valid sale-and-
leaseback, the transaction had economic substance. 3
Compelled or Encouraged by Business or Regulatory Realities
The Court determined that the sale-and-leaseback transaction
was compelled by "Worthen's undercapitalization"" and was en-
couraged by Worthen's inability to carry its building plans into
effect by a conventional mortgage and other borrowing. 5 In addition
to these business realities, federal restrictions required that an inde-
pendent third party own the building" and state banking regulators
suggested that Worthen obtain an option to repurchase the build-
ing.
47
It is clear, however, that an artificial transaction constructed
to avoid non-tax government restrictions would not be validated
for tax purposes simply because of business realities. It must be
remembered that a compelling business reality was but one of the
indicia of a valid sale-and-leaseback.
Imbued with Tax-Independent Considerations
Lyon's need to diversify its holdings was one of eight factors
listed by the district court as persuasive in its determination that
the transaction was based on tax-independent considerations.48 The
United States Supreme Court considered this factor to be Lyon's
principal motivation for entering the transaction. 49
Not Shaped Solely by Tax Avoidance Features
The Court conceded that Lyon had considered the favorable tax
consequences before entering into the transaction. The Court, how-
42. Id. at 567.
43. Other factors that established economic substance included the risk borne by Lyon
that Worthen might default or fail; the fact that if the building lease were not extended, Lyon
would be the full owner of the building, free to do with it as it chose (until its ground lease
expired); Lyon's liability for the substantial ground rent if Worthen decided not to exercise
any of its options to extend; and the absence of an understanding between Lyon and Worthen
that Worthen would exercise any of the purchase options. 435 U.S. 561, 583.




48. (1975) FED. TAXES (P-H) (36 A.F.T.R.2d) 75-5154, 5158 (E.D. Ark. June 11,
1975).
49. 435 U.S. 561, 582.
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ever, saw no reason for disallowing those consequences as it ac-
knowledged "the reality that the tax laws effect the shape of nearly
every business transaction."50 At the same time, the Court empha-
sized that it was "not condoning manipulation by a taxpayer
through arbitrary labels and dealings that have no economic signifi-
cance.''1' The Court determined that "the nonfamily and nonprivate
nature of the entire transaction . . . and the absence of any differ-
ential in tax rates and of special tax circumstances for one of the
parties . * . convince us that Lyon has far the better of the case."52
The United States Supreme Court concluded that "so long as
the lessor retains significant and genuine attributes of the tradi-
tional lessor status, the form of the transaction adopted by the
parties governs for-tax purposes. What those attributes are in any
particular case will necessarily depend upon its facts."5 3 It therefore
appears certain that recognition of sale-and-leaseback transactions
will remain a case by case determination.
It is not certain that Lyon significantly clarifies the existing
guidelines in sale-and-leaseback transactions. Still, it spells out fac-
tors which the courts should consider in the analysis of each case.
Lyon teaches that multiple party transactions are more favored
than two-party transactions; the existence of an independent third-
party creditor may validate a transaction otherwise inadequate to
insure the anticipated tax benefits.
In addition to the number of parties, their identity and relation-
ship will be considered. The fact that one of the parties to the
transaction serves on the board of directors of two of the principal
corporate parties will not diminish the validity of an otherwise
sound nonfamily and nonprivate relationship.
To insure that the business reasons supporting the transaction
have economic substance, the form of the transaction will be care-
fully evaluated. Thus, a showing that the rental, option, and pur-
chase prices are reasonable, either in relation to each other or in
relation to the marketplace, lends credence to the arrangement. As
in Lyon, a compelling business reason or regulatory reality adds
further validity to the proposed sale-and-leaseback.
Whatever the form of the transaction, tax avoidance cannot be
the sole reason for the transaction. Although the importance of tax
considerations in any major financial venture will be recognized, a
50. Id. at 580.
51. Id. at 583.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 584.
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showing by the taxpayer that tax independent considerations, such
as diversification of assets, underlie the transaction may prove es-
sential to its validity. In this determination, courts will look closely
at the intent of the parties. Thus, a meaningless label applied to a
transaction shaped solely by tax avoidance features will normally
prove useless as well.
It is clear that the genuine sale-and-leaseback will be recog-
nized for tax purposes and will allow a taxpayer to claim deductions
for depreciation and interest based on his ownership of the property.
What is less clear is precisely how much the Lyon decision illumi-
nates the semi-darkness surrounding the tax treatment of sale-and-
leaseback transactions.54
Lane H. Strother
54. In a United States Tax Court decision, Hilton v. Commissioner, No. 2088-74, de-
cided in the fall of 1978, special trial Judge Charles Johnston cited Lyon for the following:
Lyon retained the property and remained liable on the mortgage; Lyon entered the transac-
tion in order to diversify its business; there was economic reality in Lyon's assumption of the
mortgage liability; Lyon was an established business with substantial assets; the transaction
was the product of arms-length bargaining between the owner/financing corporation and the
lessee; the rents were unchallenged and were reasonable throughout the period of the lease;
the option prices represented fair estimates of market value on the applicable dates; and Lyon
faced a real risk of loss.
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